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ABSTRACT
It is common for planning agencies to encourage (read require)
the inclusion of first floor retail space in mixed-income
housing developments in urban areas. Such agencies view the
inclusion of retail in these residential developments as good
planning practice. The inclusion of first floor retail space
is expected to achieve several planning and economic
development objectives: to contribute to the vitality of
street life; to enhance the revitalization of neighborhood
shopping areas; and, to insure the provision of jobs, goods,
and services for neighborhood residents.
The policy to include retail is, in effect, a negotiated
development exaction in which the affordable housing developer
may be a reluctant participant to the concept of mixed-use.
The mixed-use concept represents a policy driven approach to
retail development for which the market may be ill-defined or
non-existent: what the planning agency wants rather than what
the market necessarily can sustain. The inclusion of a
commercial/retail component at a minimum poses both additional
financial and operating risk for the developer.
Three case studies of mixed-income residential developments in
Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts are used to examine the
effect of the current public policy driven approach on two
projects in comparison with a privately initiated project
which followed a market driven approach. The cases will
illustrate the ability of each approach to meet the needs of
both public and private sector participants.
For developers and planners to find common ground they must
devise a modus vivendi that accommodates each other's needs.
Planning ideals, economic development objectives and financial
feasibility must be integrated.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
INTRODUCTION
It is common for planning agencies to encourage (read
require) the inclusion of first floor retail space in mixed-
income housing developments in urban areas. The primary
objective of this exhortation is the provision of affordable
and mixed-income housing, bringing a diverse population back
to center city neighborhoods, and doing so in a way which
enhances neighborhood vitality.
Such agencies view the inclusion of retail in these
residential developments as good planning practice.
Although the retail element is typically a small piece of
the total project, it is considered an essential component
of an attractive urban neighborhood. The inclusion of
ground floor retail space is expected to achieve several
planning and economic development objectives: to contribute
to the vitality of street life; to enhance the
revitalization of neighborhood shopping areas; and, to
insure the provision of jobs, goods, and services for
neighborhood residents. Many of these mixed-use projects
are intended to be bold, visible statements of
public/private reinvestment in the community and their
purpose is to spark additional private investment in the
area.
From the developer's perspective, the policy to
include retail is, in effect, a negotiated development
exaction in which the affordable housing developer may be a
reluctant participant to the concept of mixed-use. The
developer's aversion to include retail may stem from his or
her belief that the retail component is tangential to the
primary objective to provide affordable housing and will not
sustain itself.
From a more general perspective, the mixed-use concept
represents a policy driven approach to retail development
for which the market may be ill-defined or non-existent:
what the planning agency wants rather than what the market
necessarily can sustain. The inclusion of a
commercial/retail component at a minimum poses both
additional financial and operating risk for the developer.
From the lender's perspective, the organization
financing the development, the inclusion of a retail
component, is traditionally viewed as increasing the
financial risk of a residential project.1 Mixed-income
housing developments are generally financed with tax-exempt
bonds. The terms of tax-exempt bond financing limit non-
residential uses to five percent of the bond issue.2
In the industry, this five percent is commonly referred to
1For one market rate, multiuse project in the state of
California, the lender required that the
residential/commercial mix be structured so that the entire
construction loan could be repaid from the sales of the
residential units alone.
2There are no similar restrictions on taxable bond
financing.
as "bad money".
To look at the issue of multiple perspectives and
expectations in connection with mixed use development more
explicitly, this study will examine how this development
triangle of developer, planning agency and lender functions
in Massachusetts under the aegis of the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), a self-supporting state
agency charged with financing and promoting the
construction, purchase and rehabilitation of housing in
Massachusetts.
In Massachusetts, the MHFA either directly or through
local lenders provides both construction and/or permanent
financing for most mixed-income housing developments. The
terms of debt financing for mixed-income rental housing
explicitly limit non-residential uses, and the MHFA does not
promote their inclusion. Although no studies have been
undertaken of performance, on the basis of anecdotal
evidence the MHFA personnel know that a retail component
often has trouble performing. Therefore, on the basis of
past experience, the MHFA has changed its policy to reflect
its view of reality that the retail component may not
always, or immediately, achieve proforma expectations. The
MHFA can require a developer building retail space to
provide letters of credit or other assurances to compensate
for any operating loss which would affect the developer's
ability to meet debt service payments.
The MHFA developer is thus placed in a bind. To
obtain permits and approvals from the city, the developer is
left with little choice but to cooperate with the planner's
insistence on a retail component. Yet to obtain project
financing from MHFA and minimize personal guarantees, it is
in the developer's interest to minimize the retail
component.
This thesis will examine how the developer attempts to
balance these conflicting objectives. It will explore the
following questions. (1) The extent to which what is
perceived as "good planning" by a local planning agency is
commensurate with a financially sound project, i.e., whether
public policy or market forces should determine the
inclusion of a retail component in a mixed-income housing
development. (2) The circumstances under which the
inclusion of a retail component can achieve public sector
goals while minimizing risk to the developer and financing
agency. (3) The reasonableness in assuming a small scale
retail component can significantly contribute to viable
neighborhood retail districts. (4) The planning and design
guidelines that can be followed to contribute to a project's
success.
Three case studies of mixed-income residential
developments in Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts are used
to explore these concerns. Although the specifics of the
case studies are unique to their locale, the issues they
raise about the inclusion of a retail component in mixed-
income residential developments and the implications of what
is essentially a "subtle exaction" pertains to a wide range
of projects, whether public, private, market rate or
affordable.
Organization of the Thesis
Chapter One sets the context for the discussion by
establishing both the public and private sector objectives
and perspectives on the inclusion of a retail component in
mixed-income developments. The chapter begins with an
overview of the public sector objectives and how they are
often influenced by neighborhood participation in the
planning process and planning decisions rather than simply
economic considerations. The next section discusses the
planning agency perspectives and objectives. It describes
why a developer may consider the method by which the
planning agency achieves those objectives as an exaction.
Finally, it presents a pure development perspective as
articulated by the Urban Land Institute (ULI): market driven
infill development. The analysis establishes the ULI
recommendations and guidelines for infill development as
sound development practice. This information provides the
background information necessary to apply the ULI principles
of good development practice to the case study examples.
The chapter concludes by pointing out the similarities and
differences in the view of the public planning agency and
the development community.
Chapter Two presents three case studies: Church Park,
in Boston's Fenway neighborhood; Douglass Plaza, in Boston's
Roxbury neighborhood; and Church Corner, in the City of
Cambridge, Massachusetts. A close look at each project
provides information on the following factors affecting the
retail component: project background and initiation; design;
scale; public policy and objectives; market considerations;
location; and financing. This information is used in the
analysis of how decisions made during project development
regarding the inclusion of a retail component affect that
development's outcome and performance. The chapter places
these three projects in the ULI framework and considers the
effectiveness of following the recommended ULI approach.
Chapter Three draws on the case study findings to make
general conclusions about the implications of a policy
driven approach to retail development which ignores market
forces. The chapter suggests that at present there is an
inherent conflict in using private developers to achieve
public objectives. Finally it will recommend actions such
that the planning agency, the developer, and the MHFA can
find a common ground to ensure the development of viable
retail components and to reduce the burden of risk on any
one participant.
CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW
This chapter establishes the public and private sector
objectives and sets them in the context of sound development
practice as developed by the Urban land Institute (ULI).3
The chapter begins with an overview of the public sector
objectives and how they are often influenced by neighborhood
participation in the planning process and planning decisions
rather than simply economic considerations. The next
section discusses the planning agency perspectives and
objectives. It describes why a developer may consider the
method by which the planning agency achieves those
objectives as an exaction. Finally, it presents a pure
development perspective as articulated by the ULI: market
driven infill development. The analysis establishes the ULI
recommendations and guidelines for infill development as
sound development practice. This information provides the
background information necessary to apply the ULI principles
of good development practice to the case study examples.
The chapter concludes by pointing out the similarities and
differences in the view of the public planning agency and
the development community.
3The Urban Land Institute is an independent, nonprofit
research and educational organization incorporated in 1936
to improve the quality and standards of land use and
development.
Public Sector Objectives: Why Planning Agencies Encourage
the Provision of Ground Floor Retail
The mixing of uses is not a new concept, particularly
in urban areas. Public policy which encourages the
development of ground floor retail space is generally
considered to be a sound planning objective and has been
advocated by Jane Jacobs, William Whyte and others in
response to the separation of uses, particularly residential
and commercial. In 1975 William Whyte proposed revisions to
the New York City zoning code which would require that fifty
percent of ground floor space be dedicated exclusively to
retail use. It worked so well that in 1982, it was changed
to require one hundred percent retail at the ground floor
level.
New York City's success inspired other cities to
follow suit although they often varied Whyte's formula. For
the provision of ground floor retailing, Denver, Colorado
gives incentive bonuses of extra floor space to developers.
Another example can be found in the City of Providence,
Rhode Island. The Providence Company encourages the
development of retail as a compliment to residential
projects in downtown Providence. Their mission statement
clearly articulates this goal:
to loan $20 million to a series of residential projects
which will support the architectural integrity and
4William H. Whyte, City: Rediscovering the Center (New
York: Doubleday, 1988), 227.
human scale of the target area. Downtown is zoned to
permit retail and we encourage retail as a component of
our projects ano as an integral component of
revitalization.
Whyte described how this concept was implemented in the city
of San Francisco, California:
[San Francisco] does not specifically mandate stores in
retail areas but twists derelopers arms to the same
effect in project reviews.
The City of Boston takes a similar approach.
A second objective of planners is the economic benefit
realized through neighborhood commercial revitalization.
Economic benefit is provided by keeping retail sales and
retail facilities within the jurisdiction. Retail is also
expected to provide excellent entry level job
opportunities.8
Planners can utilize various types of land use
controls such as zoning or incentive bonuses, or a
negotiated development process to achieve their objectives
through the provision of ground floor retail.
5The Providence Company, "Loan Fund Program Guidelines,"
in Jane Adler Seiden, "An Analysis of Downtown Housing
Trends" (M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1988), Appendix A.
6Ibid.
International City Management Association, The Practice
of Local Government Planning (Washington, D.C.: ICMA, 1979),
596.
8To estimate job creation the urban development action
grant (UDAG) application uses a industry standard of one job
created per four hundred square feet of retail space.
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The Influence of Citizen Participation
In Boston and Cambridge, neighborhood groups often play
a significant role in the development process; and
therefore, in the extent to which mixing uses is an issue of
public debate. Boston's "community planning process gives
special attention to each neighborhood, and provides
communities with a significant role in shaping land use
controls to meet the individual needs of their
neighborhoods."9
The South End Neighborhood Housing Initiative, (SENHI)
exemplifies how a community process helped to shape the new
zoning and development guidelines for Boston's South End
neighborhood. Residents' comments on the provision of
commercial space were mixed. One letter clearly articulated
the need for some commercial space.
Residents must be able to shop within their own
neighborhood in light of ever increasing traffic
patterns. Commercial space should be encouraged
provided that each neighborhood have control over the
types of businesses in order that service needs of the
neighborhood are met.. .Grocery stores (vs. convenience
stores) banks, laundromats, and hardware stores should
be encouraged. MBE's (Minority Business Enterprises)
can be encouraged to own and/or operate
local/neighborhood based service businesses.
A neighborhood homeowner's association provided a
dissenting perspective.
9Boston Redevelopment Authority, A Plan to Manage Growth
(n.d.), 32.
10Boston Redevelopment Authority, South End Neighborhood
Housing Initiative - Community Comments (January 1987), 62.
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New construction on the Washington street parcels
should not include commercial development. Adequate
opportunities are already available within existing
buildings for small neighborhood commercial uses. New
construction on Washingtgn Street area parcels should
be entirely residential.
The idea that adequate retail opportunities exist
within the neighborhood calls the planning agencies'
requirement for additional retail space into question. The
requirement for new retail space may not be the only way to
achieve public objectives.
Retail Components as Development Exactions
The American Heritage Dictionary defines exaction as
"the act of demanding or requiring that which is not justly
due; extortion." The issue of whether development exactions
are "justly due" continues to be a controversial topic among
developers and planning agencies.1 However, as the debate
rages on, planning agencies continue to extract exactions in
various forms. Linkage, inclusionary zoning, and off-site
infrastructure improvements are common types of development
exactions.
Exactions may be explicitly mandated or negotiated.
Typically, in projects involving linkage or inclusionary
zoning, the application of a standard formula will determine
11Ibid., 137.
'
2Terry Jill Lassar, "Great Expectations: The Limits of
Incentive Zoning," Urban Land, May 1990, 12-15.
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the fee to be paid or the amount of affordable housing to be
provided. Exactions such as the provision of off-site
infrastructure improvements are often negotiated
extensively. Whether explicit or negotiated it remains an
exaction; an element of the development program which would
not have been provided but for public policy requirements
and the influence of the planning agency.
Developer's resistance to the inclusion of first floor
retail space is not new or unique to Boston. Whyte
describes the situation in New York City in 1977.
The most flagrant nose-thumbing in New York was done by
apartment house developers...Around the corner from
where I live a developer put up a building with dummy
storefronts instead of the real stores required by the
zoning.
However, planning agencies do not view the inclusion
of ground floor retail as an exaction or extortion. These
agencies perceive public benefit through the realization of
public policy objectives and the expectation that the retail
space will be profitable for the developer. On a square
foot basis, the construction cost of retail space is less
than the construction cost of residential space.1 Retail
space also has the potential to realize higher rents than
residential space. Therefore, it is viewed by planning
13William H. Whyte, City: Rediscovering the Center (New
York: Doubleday, 1988), 244.
14At Douglass Plaza, square foot costs were estimated at
$71.33 for residential construction and $26.00 for
commercial construction.
agencies as a program element which provides mutual benefit:
financially viable return and neighborhood improvement.
ULI Project Context: Mixed-Use
There are a variety of ways to define projects which
mix uses. Publications of the ULI describe a continuum,
ranging from large scale multiuse developments at one end to
smaller scale infill projects on the other.1 There are no
clear boundaries between types and there are no hard and
fast rules for determining the mix of uses.
The ULI uses the term multiuse to broadly define any
development that incorporates more than one significant use,
and which may or may not be physically and functionally
integrated.1 One case study example, Church Park,
completed in 1974, meets this definition but generally,
mixed-income residential projects developed in the last few
years lack a retail component of sufficient size to be
considered a significant second use.
Today's mixed-income residential developments with a
15Scale is relative and difficult to define however, two
Boston examples illustrate these types. Copley Place in
Boston represents a large scale mixed-use development while
Tent City in Boston's South End represents a small scale
infill project.
16The ULI describes physical and functional integration
as "van intensive use of land" and "interconnection of
project components through an elaborate pedestrian
circulation network." The Urban Land Institute, The Mixed-
Use Development Handbook, (1987), 4.
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small ground floor retail space exhibit the characteristics
of an "infill" project. As described by the ULI, an infill
project has four characteristics: (1) project sites are
limited in size to a few acres; (2) the surrounding
development is at least fifteen to twenty years old; (3) the
bulk of the property has been vacant or grossly underused
for at least five years; and, (4) the size of the built
project relates to its surroundings. The latter is
perhaps the most differentiating characteristic of an infill
project which lacks the scale and physical functional
diversity of today's mixed use projects. Infill
developments can be any individual use, residential or
retail, or a combination of uses.
Residential Infill: Ingredients for Success
In his book, Making Infill Projects Work, Eric Smart
of the ULI identifies three factors necessary for successful
residential infill projects: safety, support services, and
image.
The need for safety is common to both residential and
retail components. Infill projects are typically located in
neighborhoods in transition, which are basically
neighborhoods trying to improve their character and image.
Therefore, security will affect the developer's ability to
17Eric Smart, Making Infill Projects Work (Washington,
D.C.: ULI - the Urban Land Institute, 1985), 22-23.
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attract both retail and residential tenants to the project.
To a large extent safety can be controlled through design,
but the inclusion of a security system is recommended
particularly for the residential component.
The availability of support services such as
convenience shopping, close proximity to schools, parks,
playgrounds, and if possible, daycare add to the
attractiveness of a residential development.
Smart suggests that "a pioneering residential infill
project must appear as an attractive 'new' neighborhood
having a distinct status and image."18 In a neighborhood
trying to upgrade itself, image is critical to attract the
market rate tenant to the project.
Retail Infill: Ingredients for Success
Smart also identifies four factors critical to the
success of retail infill developments: (1) critical mass;
(2) an attractive and safe pedestrian environment;
(3) accessibility and convenient parking; and, (4) location.
The retail infill project should have sufficient
critical mass, i.e., scale and density. Smart tells us that
Retail uses benefit by being part of a larger shopping
area that encourages the pedestrian to walk along a
vital and continuous row of shopfronts. A major
18Eric Smart, Making Infill Projects Work (Washington,
D.C.: ULI - the Urban Land Institute, 1985), 22.
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development gap between existing shops and new retail
such as is often created by parking or non-retail uses
will makn it more difficult for new retail uses to
succeed.
Whyte supports this view. He suggests that retail
districts should be "compressed into a relatively small area
to achieve the density necessary to allow them to thrive.
Rather than be spread out, stores should be close enough to
be within supporting distance of each other."2
An attractive and safe pedestrian environment should
be provided. Smart suggests that a traditional retail
street should offer some of the comfort and amenities one
might find in an enclosed mall. Attractive paving,
landscaping, lighting, street furniture, and weather
protection are the basic amenities one would expect to find
in any urban streetscape. There should be places which
provide shade and shelter for pedestrians.
The successful retail area should be accessible by
automobile and within a brief walking distance from mass
transit. Vehicular access and parking should be convenient
and clearly defined.
The importance of location should not be
underestimated. A successful retail location will be along
a well-travelled pedestrian or vehicular route between two
Ibid., 23.
2OWilliam H. Whyte, City: Rediscovering the Center (New
York: Doubleday, 1988), 321.
destinations. Sufficient pedestrian traffic can compensate
for poor or non-existent vehicular access.
Experience has shown that the residential components
should maintain a separate identity from the retail. An
attempt should be made to visually separate the uses to
avoid the appearance of "an apartment over the store".
Similarly, the retail component should have a distinct
presence on the street. It should not be too disguised as
part of a predominately residential building.
With the exception of the case study examples in his
book, Smart does not specifically address infill projects
that combine residential and retail uses. However,
application of all the aforementioned characteristics should
result in a sound project. Projects which do not exhibit
these elements are not doomed to failure, however, their
chances for success are much greater if a majority of these
elements are present. The general economic condition of
a neighborhood is a factor beyond the control of the
development team which will exert an important influence
over the project. This factor will play a large role in
determining whether the project will be immediately viable
in the short term.
21Eric Smart, Making Infill Projects Work (Washington,
D.C.: ULI - the Urban Land Institute, 1985), 81.
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Types of Neighborhood Retail Areas
In Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority has
worked to articulate a neighborhood business district
hierarchy that is relevant to our discussion of infill
development: the neighborhood cluster, the neighborhood
center, and the community center. Retail developments are
generally categorized according to the size of the retail
component and the type of tenant.
The BRA definition of neighborhood clusters conjures
up an image of the old corner store. The BRA describes
neighborhood clusters as:
a few isolated stores located in predominately
residential areas. They are stores which serve only
the immediate neighborhood with customers typically
walking a short distance to shop. The businesses are
usually convenience or variety stores and frequently
are locally owned. Where buildings have more than one
story, 22the stores are generally limited to the ground
floor.
The next step up in size is the neighborhood center, a
linear shopping street:
typically one to three blocks long with stores limited
to the first and second floors. Business such as small
grocery stores, dry cleaners, beauty shops and
restaurants are mixed with residential usgs. Customers
generally walk from the surrounding area.
Community centers are the largest district applicable
to our discussion. Commercial centers:
Boston Redevelopment Authority, Citizen's Guide to
Neighborhood Business Districts in Boston: Zoning and Other
Tools for Improvement (n.d.), 10.
23Ibid.
are predominately commercial. They have more stores
than neighborhood centers and draw customers from a
wider area. Many shoppers walk, but more drive or take
mass transit. Community centers may stretch out along
a single street or they may surround a central square.
A wide range of goods and services including
entertainment, clothing and department stores arn often
available.. .traffic and parking may be concerns.
Conclusion
The needs of public agencies, neighborhood groups, the
ULI, and the development community converge around the
purpose of infill projects. All agree that infill projects
can achieve different purposes; they can be pioneer projects
setting an example and pattern for subsequent investment, or
they can "address an existing neighborhood need and thereby
strengthen the overall fabric of the community". In
practice, it appears that projects initiated by the public
sector are mainly intended as catalysts for additional
investment and are fueled by numerous public objectives;
while projects initiated by a developer are purely market
driven, i.e., meeting the needs of an identified market.
However, their perspectives diverge in the method of
execution. The exaction of retail space by planning
agencies represents a policy driven, "if you build it they
will come" approach to commercial development.
2 4Ibid., 12.
25Eric Smart, Making Infill Projects Work (Washington,
D.C.: ULI - the Urban Land Institute, 1985), 7.
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Rather than dictate the provision of mixing uses, the
ULI advocates that the public agencies should provide
opportunities for the mixing of uses to occur and then stand
back and let it happen rather than try to force the issue.
The ULI view, shared by the development community and the
MHFA, represents a market driven approach as opposed to a
policy driven approach to development.
The following case studies will examine the effect of
the current public policy driven approach on two projects in
comparison with a privately initiated project which followed
a market driven approach. The cases will illustrate the
ability of each approach to meet the needs of both public
and private sector participants and the greater community.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CASE STUDIES
This chapter consists of three case studies: Church
Park, in Boston's Fenway neighborhood; Douglass Plaza, in
Boston's Roxbury neighborhood; and Church Corner, in the
City of Cambridge, Massachusetts. A description of the
methodology; how the three case study projects were selected
is found in the appendix. A close look at each project
provides information on the following factors affecting the
retail component: project background and initiation; design;
scale; public policy & objectives; market considerations;
location; and financing. This information is then used in
the analysis of how decisions made during project
development in connection with the inclusion of a retail
component affect that development's outcome and
performance. The examples of Church Park and Douglass
Plaza, will illustrate how the policy driven, exaction
method of retail development has worked in practice. Church
Corner will be used to examine the private, market driven
approach. The chapter places these three projects in the
ULI framework and considers the effectiveness of following
the recommended ULI approach.
The Case Studies
Church Park: Boston, Massachusetts
Church Park, completed in 1974, is a large development
in which both residential and retail components are
significant uses. Although Church Park is now a viable and
stable project, the success of the retail component was slow
to arrive.
Site Characteristics
Church Park is located on Massachusetts Avenue in
Boston's Fenway-Kenmore neighborhood, across from the world
center for the Church of Christian Science. Prior to the
development of Church Park, the site was a predominately
commercial area including such landmarks as the Loews State
Theater, the Astor Post Office, and the Boston Storage
Warehouse at the corner of Massachusetts and Westland
Avenues (see Fig. 1). Across Massachusetts Avenue were
apartments and stores in a typical walk-up configuration.
A life-long resident of the area recalled:
there were all types of stores, of all price levels, on
Massachusetts Avenue. No matter what your income,
there was something for you. Years ago, there was a
fruit market, like in the market district downtown,
where people went to pick out their own fruit and
vegetables. We got our Christmas trees there. It was
open all night. Rabinovitz's delicatessen was on the
corner and a cigar store Indian stood nearby. It was a
really homey section.
The expansion needs of the Church of Christian Science set
in motion a massive redevelopment effort which would
radically alter the character of Massachusetts Avenue.
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Figure 1. Free-hand sketch of Massachusetts Avenue at Church
Park site by the late George Durward. The Boston 200
Corporation, The Fenway: Boston 200 Neighborhood History
Series (1976), 9.
The Urban Renewal Plan & ObJectives
"The expansion needs of the Christian Science Church,
together with the slow deterioration typical of intown
housing and commercial conditions led to the formation of a
26Joyce Ellis, interview. The Fenway: Boston 200
Neighborhood History Series (1976), 12.
28
renewal plan by the BRA in 1965."t27 The renewal plan and
objectives were closely aligned with the needs of the
church.
Local planning objectives for the Fenway area were the
provision of "new and improved commercial and institutional
space in the Project Area and of creating new and
rehabilitated low-and moderate-income housing."28 The
renewal plan encouraged commercial development,
in low-rise structures and on the lower floors of
residential structures along the major streets of the
area (Massachusetts and Huntington Avenues). The heart
of the retail development should be along Massachusetts
Avenue and should provide primarily locally-oriented
shopping facilities designed to meet the needs of the
adjacent residential community.
Church Park was part of the master plan prepared for
the Church of Christian Science by I.M. Pei & Associates,
Architects (see Fig. 2). Later, Pei's concept would be
incorporated in the Fenway urban renewal plan. "Dynamic
rejuvenation" were the words used to describe the impact of
the church's expansion on the Massachusetts and Huntington
Avenue neighborhoods.0 Across from the Church property,
2 7Boston Redevelopment Authority, Fenway-Kenmore District:
Background Information, Planning Issues and Preliminary
Neighborhood Improvement Strategies (June 1975), 3.
28Ibid., 43.
29Ibid., 8.
30Hunneman and Company, Inc., Land Utilization and
Marketability Study of the Fenway Urban Renewal Area (196_),
IV-2.
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Figure 2. Master plan prepared for the Christian Science
church by I.M. Pei & Associates, Architects. Courtesy
Boston Redevelopment Authority.
long residential/commercial buildings were to line
Massachusetts and Huntington Avenues. These buildings were
designed to provide an appropriate setting or background for
the Church itself. A land utilization and marketability
study of the Fenway urban renewal area prepared by Hunneman
and Company, Inc. noted that, "The influence of the First
Church of Christ, Scientist, in the Fenway Urban Renewal
area is of first importance."31 Indeed, the Church's
expansion needs formed the core of the renewal plan to the
extent that it is difficult to separate the two.
Project Initiation & the Development Program
Over time, the Church of Christian Science acquired
much of the land along Huntington, Massachusetts, and
Westland Avenues. With assistance from the BRA, the Church
assembled land into large redevelopment parcels and sold to
private developers for redevelopment in conformance with
Pei's proposed plan. The church approached a local
developer, The Niles Company, which later formed the United
Company Limited Partnership, as the ownership vehicle for
the Church Park development.
The urban renewal plan dictated new construction on
the disposition parcel #11 (Church Park) as "residential,
commercial on lower floors, with a maximum FAR of 5.5".32
Although the renewal plan promotes retail, the developer
felt that they were allowed some flexibility with the
program. Parking was briefly considered but the developers
31Ibid., IV-3.
3 2Boston Redevelopment Authority, Urban Renewal Plan -
Fenway Urban Renewal Area (November 1, 1965), 24.
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recognized that a blank wall eight hundred feet in length,
along Massachusetts Avenue would be disastrous. The
developer recalled that housing was not considered
appropriate for the ground floor space so thoughts naturally
turned to retail.
Market Considerations and The Retail Component
The Fenway urban renewal plan seriously considered the
development of new retail areas and its financial
feasibility. A study was prepared by Hunneman and Company,
Inc. to analyze new retail opportunities for the Fenway
area. The Hunneman study considered four factors:
(1) the amount of existing retail space which will be
demolished, (2) the estimated population of the project
area after renewal, (3) the primary and secondary trade
areas of the Fenway and, (4) the competition
represented by existing a3id planned retail developments
outside the project area.
The Hunneman study identified the quantity and
location of retail space within the Fenway urban renewal
area. One hundred forty-two establishments, with a total
estimated floor area of 378,000 square feet were counted in
a survey of first floor retail space. Convenience goods and
services dominated the mixture of shops. Existing retail
space was concentrated along both sides of Massachusetts
Avenue between Boylston and Falmouth Streets.
33Hunneman and Company, Inc., Land Utilization and
Marketability Study of the fenway Urban Renewal Area (196_),
VII-9.
The Hunneman study also identified the primary and
secondary trade areas served by this retail space. The
study concluded that the primary trade area boundary would
remain unchanged but that its composition and
characteristics would change. Specifically, "new residents
with higher median incomes would constitute a larger segment
of the population."3 Residential sections bordering the
perimeter of the primary trade area are considered a
secondary trade area which was expected to expand
"particularly in view of increased parking, new street
patterns, diminished congestion and increased open
space."
Many stores would be demolished as a result of the
proposed plan:
The proposed renewal project will eliminate 118 first
floor retail establishments containing approximately
284,000 square feet. Obviously it will be necessary to
replace these retail facilities not only because they
represent convenience shopping to those who now reside
in the Fenway area, but also because we believe such
facilities are essential to the success of the
redevelopment 36plan and the proposed new residential
construction.
Hunneman estimated that the development of 200,000
square feet of new retail space for convenience goods and
services would provide adequate replacement. Also, that
this amount of space could be supported by the population of
34Ibid. , VII-10.
35 Ibid.
36Ibid., VII-9.
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the primary and secondary trade areas. The westerly side of
Massachusetts Avenue between Boylston Street and Westland
Avenue was identified as the "most suitable and appropriate
location for the major portion of these facilities."37
Today, Church Park provides 72,070 square feet of
ground floor retail space in this location. The first floor
of the Church Park apartment building provides 57,070 square
feet of retail and office space while the ground floor of
the freestanding parking garage behind Church Park provides
an additional fifteen thousand square feet of retail space.
Design
The building's design and its placement on the site
immediately put the retail at a major disadvantage. In
anticipation of the proposed widening of Massachusetts
Avenue, Church Park was set back farther than usual from the
existing street edge. With the abandonment of the urban
renewal plan, all hope was lost for the reconstruction and
widening of Massachusetts Avenue.38 Thus, Church Park was
37Ibid., VII-10.
38In 1972, dissatisfaction with the renewal plan led some
Fenway residents to file a class action lawsuit against the
Church of Christian Science, the BRA, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and others.
Subsequently, the urban renewal plan was abandoned, but not
before many elements of the plan were carried out. Church
Park was one of the first buildings to be constructed.
Later, the Church of Christian Science completed their
expansion plans, and in 1978 and 1979 two towers, Symphony
Plaza East and West, rose at the southern gateway:
Massachusetts and Huntington Avenues. The towers at
34
left with an extraordinarily deep setback from Massachusetts
Avenue. For several years this had an adverse impact on the
retail portion of the project.
The Fenway renewal plan established specific design
guidelines for new construction.
new development should not form a wall between existing
residential communities and the proposed commercial
activity on Massachusetts and Huntington avenues.
Therefore, it is important that adequate and suitably
designed pedestrian walkways and pedestrian-oriented
activities be provided through the new developments to
link these areas.
This provision was probably included in an attempt to
minimize the impact of Pei's plan where Church Park, and a
similar project on Huntington Avenue create a virtual wall
across the street from the Christian Science Center property
(see Fig.3). Church Park, a white, concrete structure was
designed to be a canvas for, and a compliment to, Pei's work
at the Christian Science Center. Its mass physically and
visually cuts off the adjacent Fenway neighborhood, west of
Massachusetts Avenue, from the Christian Science Center
property.
Massachusetts Avenue and Boylston were never constructed,
and the proposed widening and construction of a median strip
in Massachusetts Avenue was never realized.
3Boston Redevelopment Authority, Urban Renewal Plan -
Fenway Urban Renewal Area (November 1, 1965), 9.
4OChurch Park is approximately 800 feet long and
11 stories high. Readers familiar with Boston's Prudential
Building may appreciate that in comparison Church Park is as
long as the Prudential Tower is tall. Treasurer F. William
Smith of Boyd-Smith, interview by author, 25 June 1991.
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Figure 3. Aerial view of Christian Science Center with
Church Park in foreground. Courtesy Boston Redevelopment
Authority.
The construction of Church Park eliminated the
connection of three streets: Astor, Norway, and Falmouth to
Massachusetts Avenue. Therefore, to comply with the design
guidelines of the renewal plan two passageways were
constructed at ground level to allow pedestrian and
vehicular access through the building to the adjacent
neighborhood. The structural framework to accommodate the
passageways increased the construction costs but they were
never utilized except for pedestrian use. By dictating the
construction of the passageways, the renewal plan appeared
to be responsive to the area residents' concerns without
necessitating changes to Pei's master plan.
Financing
The United Company first sought project financing from
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). At the time, FHA
financing did not require a developer to provide affordable
housing so the development program made no provision for it.
Also, the FHA was a full-blown bureaucracy and the United
Company could not get a decision regarding financing the
project. The FHA kept studying the matter and asking for
more information. The developer recalled that there may
have been an issue around meeting FHA cost guidelines.
At about the same time there was a social outcry about
the affordable housing situation,
I remember very clearly people from Wellesley, in fur
coats . . . they were supporting the neighborhood
effort and protesting the BRA ac ion - picketing in
front of [the site] Church Park.
According to the developer, F. William Smith, the outcry
caused Bill White at the MHFA to offer to finance the
project. In 1972, the MHFA was a young agency willing to
41Treasurer F. William Smith of Boyd-Smith, Inc.,
telephone interview by author, 25 July 1991.
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take a chance on Church Park and the United Company. It is
likely that Bill White was interested in affordable housing
rather than the retail component, but according to Smith's
recollection, the size of the retail component was never
called into question.2 MHFA provided the sole source of
financing for the project.43
With financing in place, construction commenced. When
the widening of Massachusetts Avenue failed to materialize,
the wide area directly in front of Church Park was left a
gravel "wasteland" and "the BRA did nothing for well over a
year. "" This situation severely limited the United
Company's ability to attract retail tenants to the building
for the entire first year.
Meanwhile, MHFA held back the permanent financing due
to the unfinished situation in front of the building. The
United Company finally had to threaten the BRA with a
lawsuit to get them to pave the area, whereupon the BRA
paved it with bituminous concrete. Only then was the United
Company able to replace the construction loan with permanent
420f the 508 apartment units, 127 were designated as
1 w
income and those rented quickly. Rentals of the remaining
381 market units lagged somewhat so an additional fifty
moderate income units were designated, leaving 331 market-
rate units.
431n 1972, the terms of tax-exempt bond financing
permitted more than five percent of an issue to be used for
non-residential uses.
44Treasurer F. William Smith of Boyd-Smith, Inc.,
interview by author, 25 June 1991, Boston.
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financing. Due to the additional year that the company had
to carry the project at a higher interest rate and the fact
that interest rates on the whole had risen over that period,
the United Company was locked into a high interest rate on
the permanent financing. A few years later, The United
Company was able to refinance the project through the MHFA
at a five percent interest rate. 5 With the lower interest
rate, Church Park's financial health gradually improved.
Leasing
Three merchants from across the street, displaced by
the renewal project were among the first tenants in Church
Park: Evan's Mens Clothing, who is still there today;
Water's Stationary which closed just last month; and a shoe
store that closed about three years ago. Brighams moved
down Massachusetts Avenue to relocate in Church Park. So
Church Park did provide replacement space for many local
tenants.
Smith indicated that Church Park has always been a
difficult location to sell to tenants. Primarily because
the arcade impedes visibility from Massachusetts Avenue and
also because there is a prohibition against hanging signs on
the exterior wall of the building.
The retail finally started to turn around when the
United Company was able to introduce a couple of successful
45Ibid.
merchants to Church Park by offering them deeply discounted
rents. Smith mentioned, "At this point we were willing to
take any warm bodies." The Post Office was the first to
arrive and brought with it a lot of pedestrian traffic.
Economy Hardware, who was being forced out of its space by
another BRA action, decided to relocate to Church Park. The
signing of a lease by Economy Hardware was the action needed
to persuade Rix, a major drugstore chain to sign. The deal
Rix accepted was that if first year sales were under
$600,000 it could terminate the lease without penalty. In
the first year of operation, Rix realized over one million
dollars in sales. The presence of these three anchors was
the necessary precondition for the establishment of Church
Park as a viable retail center and to attract other tenants
to the project. Prior to that merchants could not be
convinced that Church park was a viable retail area. The
project now receives substantial income from the
commercial/retail uses.
Experience Gained: Effectiveness of the Policy Driven
Approach at Church Park
1. Neighborhood reinvestment can not be attributed to
a vital retail area. In 1976, two years after the
46Ibid.
47In 1990, 32.3% of total income was from
retail/commercial uses: $652,608 from commercial rentals and
$1,086,676 from parking garage operations.
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completion of Church Park, residents comments indicate that
the project was beginning to achieve the planner's objective
of stimulating neighborhood reinvestment. However, their
comments also reveal that the retail component was still
struggling to get off the ground. This would indicate that
the neighborhood reinvestment was not attributable to the
presence of a retail component in Church Park.
For all that the Church development on Mass Ave has
done in terms of destroying the atmosphere, it has
improved the living situation between Massachusetts
Avenue and Hemenway Street, on the other side of
Westland Ave. A lot of apartment buildings have been
gutted and redone.
Its sad not to see the business on Massachusetts
Avenue, sad to see all the ground floor stores in
Church Park empty . . . Many residents had hoped to
preserve and upgrade the existing affordable housing.
They cherished the small personal shops.
2. The planner's goal, the creation of a successful
retail area may have a negative, and perhaps unexpected side
effect on a segment of the population which it is intended
to benefit: the small, local merchant. Success brings
change and it is difficult for the small business owner to
compete with the large, well-capitalized national and
regional franchises.
In his article "Livable Streets: Protected
Neighborhoods" Donald Appleyard, referring to the Jane
Jacobs idealized street asks, "Can we retain or somehow
48John Moriarty, interview. The Fenway: Boston 200
Neighborhood History Series (1976): 25-6.
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recreate this nearly lost form of urban life?"9 His
answer is no. He believes that where it has been attempted,
the results are very different from the livable, old
neighborhood streets of the past.
This [new] kind of street life is quite different from
working-class street life. Most of it has gravitated
to the main commercial streets because the families
with vast numbers of children simply do not exist, and
the little old neighborhood shops and local industries
that provided the mixed uses and life that Jane Jacobs
argued for are having a hard time surviving.
Church Park exemplifies that change. It is neither a
traditional urban retail street, nor a traditional urban
residential street. If the residential portion were removed
it could be any suburban strip shopping center. Since
Church Park has become a popular retail area the small,
local businesses that have been there for a long time are
getting pushed out as their current leases expire. The
card/book/gift shop, for example, is still paying rent of
approximately ten dollars per square foot, approximately
fifteen dollars less than the current rate.51 When their
current lease expires, it is unlikely that the developer,
his space now able to command higher rents, will consider
subsidizing this small tenant any longer.
49Donald Appleyard, "Livable Streets: Protected
Neighborhoods?" The Annals of The American Academy of
Political and Social Science: Vol 451 September, 1980: 109.
50Ibid.
51Treasurer F. William Smith of Boyd-Smith, Inc.,
interview by author, 25 June 1991, Boston.
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3. The inclusion of a retail component reflected a
market reality. The Hunneman study identified a market area
for the retail and correctly predicted changes in its
composition. However the predicted change was slow to
arrive. A general uplifting of neighborhood economic
conditions was required before the retail started to turn
around. The study did not discuss the impact of the timing
of the market changes.
4. After its construction, Church Park was thwarted
by neighborhood opposition to the urban renewal plan that
created it and by inactivity on the part of the public
agency that promoted the plan. The abandonment of the
proposed Massachusetts Avenue "improvements" ultimately
benefitted the residential component, by distancing it from
the street noise of Massachusetts Avenue; but at the same
time it immediately and negatively affected the marketing
and leasing of the retail space.
Two factors made it difficult to lease the retail
portion: the large setback and the distance from
Massachusetts Avenue and the failure of the BRA to timely
complete the sidewalk improvements within the widened right-
of-way. When the BRA finally performed, it used low quality
materials. The current better quality pavement and trees
have been recently installed. It is unclear why the BRA
failed to act; by doing so they were impeding the
realization of their own objectives.
Douglass Plaza: Boston, Massachusetts
Douglass Plaza is a new development in Boston's Lower
Roxbury/South End Neighborhood. Completed in June 1989,
during a significant downturn in the local real estate
market, the project is having difficulty renting both
residential units and the commercial space. Many of the
residential condominiums remain unsold.
Site Characteristics
The project site is between the Massachusetts Avenue
and Ruggles stops on the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority
(MBTA) orange line (see Fig. 4). Douglass Plaza was built
on urban renewal land originally owned by the MBTA.52 It
consists of 122 units of housing, thirty-three subsidized
units and thirty-three condominiums for first time home
buyers. Also, there are seven thousand square feet of
commercial space and 146 underground parking spaces.
BRA Policy and Objectives
Douglass Plaza is the first project in the Lower
Roxbury-South End neighborhood sparked by the relocation of
the MBTA subway's orange line. The project was initiated by
52Under the original renewal plan, a school was proposed
for this site. Project manager Jeffrey M. Goodman, Esq. of
the BLC, interview by author, 26 June 1991, Boston.
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Figure 4. Context map. Douglass Plaza site is one-half of
the shaded parcel number sixteen. Church Park is at upper
left. Courtesy Boston Redevelopment Authority.
the BRA which owned the land.53 Like Church Park, Douglass
Plaza is characteristic of a residential infill project
designed to inspire private reinvestment in Boston's Roxbury
neighborhood. A recent promotional publication sums up
Boston's expectations for the Lower Roxbury neighborhood:
Economic opportunities and safe, viable neighborhoods.
The strategy for achieving this goal in the Roxbury
community has been to quite literally replace a history
of economic disadvantage with a future of economic
opportunity and promise. In the past six years,
significant investment in the construction of
affordable housing, public works improvements, job
training, neighborhood business development, and
targeted linkage funds have been the key elements of
the Roxbury neighborhood strategy.
Development controls for Douglass Plaza are dictated
by the Roxbury Interim Planning Overlay District (IPOD)
zoning amendment. The Roxbury IPOD articulates nine goals.
1. Control Land Speculation and Displacement
2. Protect Residential Character
3. Provide Affordable Housing
4. Direct Growth
5. Provide Adequate Parking
6. Preserve, Enhance, and Create Open Space
7. Direct Nonhazardous Industrial Uses to Appropriate
Sites
8. Promote Viable Commercial Districts
9. Preserve and Protect the Quality of Life
Within the Roxbury IPOD, the Douglass Plaza site lies
between Tremont Street and Columbus Avenue each of which are
designated Boulevard Planning Districts (BPDs). Boulevard
53Generally, the BRA's policy is to dispose of the public
land for public purposes. The BRA does not retain an
interest in "low value" parcels such as this.
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"Boston's Safe Neighborhoods Plan: Linking Opportunity
and Security for a Safe Viable Future" (n.d.), 4-5.
46
Planning Districts were established to:
protect and promote certain major arterials and cross
streets as mixed-use commercial centers and as gateways
to the community... The permitted mix of uses in the
BPDs will promote and sustain economic viability and
residential stability by providing employment
opportunities, services for residenhs and visitors, and
affordable and market rate housing.
The BRA understands that to achieve their reinvestment
objectives Douglass Plaza must present a spectacular new
image in this old, tired neighborhood. Both the MHFA and
the BLC recalled that an attractive project was of prime
importance to the BRA. Also, that BRA design requirements
often increase the cost of a project.56
Project Initiation
In 1982, the BRA gave tentative designation to the
non-profit Concord Baptist Church (CBC) as redevelopers of
Parcel 16, the Douglass Plaza site, in the South End Urban
Renewal District. Like many community based non-profits,
the CBC had no housing experience and few resources such as
money for up-front expenses. To enable the CBC to continue
their involvement in the project, the Boston Land Company
(BLC) was brought in as a partner who could provide the
5 5Boston Redevelopment Authority, Roxbury Neighborhood
Planning and Zoning: The Interim Planning Overlay District,
(n.d.), 7-8.
56Project manager Jeffrey M. Goodman, Esq. of the BLC,
interview by author, 26 July 1991, Boston. Architect, Diane
Georgopolis of the MHFA, interview by author, 28 June 1991,
Boston.
47
necessary experience and resources.
The Design Review Process
Both the BRA and the MHFA describe the design review
process as a cooperative effort. Although the BRA notes
that the MHFA "frequently yields to the BRA" and allows the
BRA to take the lead role."57
According to the BRA design review architect for
Douglass Plaza, their review process focuses on the public
realm. The BRA defines the public realm as "public spaces,
the activities that occur within them, and the environment
surrounding them . . . any element that contributes to the
pedestrian experience. Functional aspects are of
secondary concern, in part, because the BRA knows that the
MHFA architects will carefully review the functional aspects
of the residential units.
The MHFA review process focuses primarily on the
internal aspects of the building and compliance with
applicable building codes. The MHFA wants to make sure that
quality housing will be provided; therefore, their attention
is focused on the residential units. At a minimum, the MHFA
reviews the efficiency and appropriateness of the
5 7Senior design review architect Thomas Maistros of the
Boston Redevelopment Authority, Telephone interview by author,
29 June 1991.
58Boston Redevelopment Authority, A Plan to Manage Growth
(n.d.), 23.
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residential unit layout, construction and operating costs,
and the mechanical systems. Public realm considerations are
left up to the BRA. Since the commercial component is just
a shell, to be finished by the tenant, the MHFA does not
give it more than a cursory review.
Throughout this process the commercial component seems
to escape the attention of both the BRA and the MHFA, other
than how it appears from the street and where on the site it
will be located.
Design and the Retail Component
The BRA exerted significant control over the design of
Douglass Plaza. From submission of the initial design
concept to final approval the BRA design review process took
at least eighteen months. The BLC's original concept was
to contain all the units, with the exception of twelve
townhouses, in a ten story elevator apartment building,
characterized by internal entry to individual units. No
retail was included. The BRA dismissed this "suburban mid-
rise apartment concept" and "encouraged" the BLC to pursue a
concept which reflected the existing pattern of urban
Architect Diane Georgopolis of the MHFA, interview by
author, 28 June 1991, Boston.
6 Senior design review architect Thomas Maistros of the
BRA, telephone interview by author, 29 July 1991.
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development in the South End (see Fig. 5).61 To create a
development plan which would "address the streets" the BRA
recommended that the new concept maximize site coverage and
create many units with direct ground floor entry. This
pattern of development is preferred for family housing and
also creates a more vital street edge.8 2
Figure 5. Architects rendering of revised concept for
Douglass Plaza. Architect: Vitols Associates. Courtesy of
Boston Redevelopment Authority.
61The BRA noted that as developer's the BLC had a suburban
focus and had not worked in Boston previously. Their first
architect responded to those suburban interests and not to
those of the BRA. Half-way through the process the BLC
changed architects in an effort to expedite the design
review process.
62The first floor units have leased well at Douglass
Plaza.
To create a suitable urban density, the BRA suggested
condensing the project onto one-half of the original
development parcel. This suggestion precipitated a search
for additional funds to construct a new street, provide the
associated infrastructure and create an underground parking
garage.63 While the revised plan was being formulated the
concept of street level retail was introduced.
The BLC would have preferred to include more first
floor residential space in lieu of the retail component but
were pressured by the BRA. According to the BLC's project
manager, the BRA wanted Douglass Plaza to provide between
ten and eleven thousand square feet of retail space. A
compromise was reached and approximately seven thousand
square feet were included in the development program.
The retail space could have been located along any one
of four streets surrounding the site; (see Fig. 6) however,
the logical choices were Tremont Street or Columbus Avenue.
In the opinion of the BRA, Columbus Avenue had a more
residential character because it is across from the Carter
Playground. The Columbus Avenue side appears to have more
pedestrian activity because of its proximity to the park and
to the Massachusetts Avenue MBTA orange line station.
Tremont Street had historically been a retail area and was
63A Community Development Action Grant (CDAG) funded
reconstruction of one street, the reconstruction of a new
street and the construction of the plaza in front of the
project.
recognized as a major neighborhood corridor by the BRA. It
was the BRA's plan to recreate that retail base and augment
retail activity along Tremont Street. So Tremont Street was
selected as the street which would have the retail frontage.
Figure 6. Douglass Plaza site plan.
Douglass Plaza is located on the fringe of a marginal
neighborhood and has neither the benefit of location nor of
accessibility. It is neither a downtown location where a
retail area might receive a lot of pedestrian traffic, nor
is it a suburban convenience center which people can drive
to and easily park. At Douglass Plaza there is no
convenient surface parking for the retail uses: a result of
the BRA's design concept.
Design of the retail space at Douglass Plaza does not
meet the fundamental requirements of major retailers. At
the corner of Tremont Street and Douglass Park, where the
retail is located, the building is curved. The curvature of
the space makes it unattractive to many merchants. Major
tenants, such as national drugstore chains, have specific
space and accessibility requirements. They are generally
inflexible about changing these unless they can be
compensated by another aspect, such as a superior location
with lots of pedestrian traffic.
The BLC had hoped to provide some limited, yet
convenient surface parking for the retail space. Both the
BRA and the MHFA pushed for the inclusion of an underground
parking garage which the BLC views as an unnecessary
expense. The parking garage is for tenants only, but some
spaces are available for the retail employees. The BLC
estimates twenty-five percent of the parking spaces are
surplus.
The retail at Douglass Plaza is a neighborhood
cluster. The prominent corner location favors retail, but
the attachment of residential uses to each end isolates the
retail and eliminates the possibility for any future
continuity of retail along Tremont Street. Also, it is the
developer's perception that the retail component is so well
53
integrated into the design of the building it does not
create a strong retail identity for the tenants. 64
Management
The retail component places only a small additional
burden on management. Maintenance, trash removal, and
security would have been necessary for the residential
portion in any event. -Security is provided for the building
in the form of surveillance cameras and security guards.
The BLC does not regard crime as an issue of concern to
potential retail tenants.
Financial Considerations
The MHFA financial commitment to Douglas Plaza is
subject to fourteen special conditions, two of which pertain
to the commercial space. These conditions reflect the
MHFA's lack of confidence in the viability of the commercial
space. Condition number seven requires "the owner to post a
Letter of Credit in the amount of $336,864 as a working
capital contingency; to be released at sustaining occupancy
of the residential and commercial space."65 Condition
number nine requires the general partners to execute a
master lease for the commercial space and parking in the
64Project manager Jeffrey M. Goodman of the BLC, interview
by author, 26 June 1991, Boston.
6 5Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, "MHFA Project
Commitment Proposal Form, Douglass Plaza", October 13, 1987.
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amount of $192,494 for the initial year. These
guarantees recognize that these small commercial spaces are
difficult to lease quickly. Realistically, the MHFA is
uncertain as to the protection offered by the guarantees
they require of the developers; as they may prove difficult
to enforce.
Leasing
Leasing of the commercial space began in the winter of
1990 when the new road and plaza were complete. Prior to
completion of that area, the developer thought that it would
be difficult to interest potential tenants in the space
(echoes of Church Park). The space was not subdivided to
allow flexibility in addressing tenants needs. The first
tenant was a mortgage origination office occupying seventeen
hundred square feet, and as of July 1991, leases have been
signed with a hair salon, and a tailor. Twenty-five hundred
square feet are still available for rent.
The developers are seeking uses which will enhance, or
at best be neutral in the residential environment, rather
than uses which will reinforce the neighborhood's negative
image. Walking through the neighborhood, one notices a
great disparity between the quality of new retail at
Douglass Plaza and the existing retail in the area. Liquor
stores, video rentals, bars and convenience stores
66Ibid.
proliferate in the neighborhood and the BLC received many
inquiries from purveyors of these goods who were looking for
additional space. Also, the developers must be sensitive to
issues of public morality. Because of the CBC's involvement
the following retail activities are barred from the project:
video stores which offer pornographic videos, even though
they are not displayed, convenience stores which sell
lottery tickets, and liquor stores. Fast food
establishments are also considered undesirable tenants
because of the associated cooking odors.
Due to the current market downturn, there are many
vacant stores and therefore competition for tenants in the
Lower Roxbury/South End neighborhood. The development
proforma projected retail rents of $15.00 per square foot
but in the current depressed market rents are only $10.00
per square foot.
Experience Gained: Effectiveness of the Policy Driven
Approach at Douglass Plaza
In hindsight, the BLC feels that they should have
fought harder to eliminate the retail component. In the
words of the project manager, "it [the retail] doesn't work,
it doesn't fit any mold . . . the vision was flawed from the
start."
Project manager Jeffrey M. Goodman, Esq. of the BLC,
interview by author, 26 June 1991, Boston.
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Although it is too soon to predict the ability of
Douglass Plaza to meet the BRA's long term objectives, we
can evaluate the short term performance of the retail
component. The following BRA action clearly speaks to yet
unrealized expectations. Approximately five or six months
ago, the BRA put together a marketing brochure to promote
retail/commercial space in similar mixed-income residential
projects throughout the Lower Roxbury/South End
neighborhoods; Douglass Plaza was included. The BRA
undertook this at their own initiative in an effort to
counteract the poor initial performance of the retail
component in these residential projects.68 Consistent poor
performance of retail components may affect the BRA's
ability to extract similar exactions in the future. The BRA
may be awakening to the need for an immediate market to
support the retail uses.
Church Corner: Cambridge, Massachusetts
Church Corner is a new development in Cambridge's
Central Square neighborhood. Completed in the spring of
1987, as the local real estate market began its decline, the
project has not had any apparent difficulties in renting
either the residential units or the commercial space. Its
success is attributable primarily to its Central Square
68 Ibid., 29 July 1991.
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location.
Site Characteristics
Church Corner is located at the corner of Magazine
Street, Franklin Street, and Green Street in Central Square
(see Fig. 7). The project provides eighty-five units of
mixed-income housing and approximately three thousand square
feet of first floor commercial space. The parcels were
previously occupied by a dilapidated, one-story structure
which contained three retail stores. The site was also used
for parking.
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Figure 7. Site plan. Courtesy Cambridge Community
Development Department.
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Project Initiation
Church Corner was initiated by Winn Development who
purchased the land from a private owner. Church Corner is
characteristic of a residential infill project designed to
fill an existing neighborhood need for mixed-income housing.
Objectives
The City of Cambridge "encourages" active ground floor
uses in multiuse districts like Central Square. Retail is
permitted but not required under the existing zoning.69
According to the Cambridge Community Development Department,
Housing was the priority, then providing parking, then
retail in the leftover space. No market studies were
required but there was an expectation that there would
be an interest in the space, even though it is not
prime space and sort of out of the way.
It is the recollection of the community development
staff that there was no requirement placed upon Winn to
provide an equal amount of retail space as a replacement or
to offer the new space to the existing retail tenants. Winn
included the retail at their own initiative. There were two
merchants in the old building at the time of its demolition.
One of these, a dry cleaning establishment, now occupies
69In some areas between Harvard and Central Squares, the
zoning ordinance actually excludes ground floor retail but
permits office use. In these areas the neighbors are
concerned that retail uses will be bad neighbors, i.e.,
dirty, loud, and exacerbate traffic and parking problems.
70Land use and zoning director Lester Barber of the
Cambridge Community Development Department, interview by
author, 25 June 1991, Cambridge.
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space in Church Corner.
The project required a comprehensive permit for
dimensional variances and a slight increase in density.
Approximately seventy units would have been permitted as of
right. The comprehensive permit process would have been the
arena for negotiation if any were to occur.
Design
There was no strong opposition to the project but
there were concerns about the bulk of the building and its
relationship to the church next door, a national historic
register property. The concern was not that the proposed
retail units would face the church, but rather with the
building's overall mass.
Parking is exclusively for residential use; some is
underground and some is structured in the lower levels of
the building.
The community development staff believed that
residential units on the first floor would be undesirable
due to the building's location, on the fringe of the
somewhat seedy Central Square area. In that neighborhood,
it is difficult to make first floor residential units
attractive to occupy work due to security concerns and the
busy retail nature of the area. The community development
staff believed that in an urban setting residences should
require greater setbacks and screening from street noise and
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activity; which was not possible on the Church Corner site.
There are a few first floor residential units along
Franklin Street. The design of these units clearly reflects
the architect's, or perhaps the developer's concern for
security. Unlike Douglass Plaza in which virtually all of
the first floor units have their front entry directly on the
street, the first floor units at Church Corner are
accessible only through the main entry. The windows are
separated from the street edge by a brick planter with a
short wrought iron fence on top which acts as a buffer,
distancing the window from the street and making it less
accessible.
This view, that in some urban locations retail is the
only appropriate first floor use, is shared by most planning
agencies and to some extent by the MHFA. 71 "Retail is a
natural use for the first floor as it provides a friendly
face to the street."72  The retail space could have been
located along any one of three streets surrounding the site;
however, Magazine Street was the logical choice. The
Magazine Street side has more pedestrian activity because of
its proximity to the main intersection at Central Square.
It is also the most prominent face of the building as seen
71Architect Diane Georgopolis of the MHFA, interview by
author, 28 June 1991, Boston.
72Land use and zoning director Lester Barber of the
Cambridge Community Development Department, interview by
author, 25 June 1991, Cambridge.
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from the square. Green Street is virtually an alley with
the exception of one establishment, the Green Street Grill,
a bar and restaurant, while Franklin Street is residentially
oriented.
Experience Gained: Effectiveness of the Market Driven
Approach at Church Corner
Church Corner represents a market-driven approach
initiated by the private sector, in which the main objective
was the provision of affordable housing. The project has
met the short term expectations of the developer, the City
of Cambridge, and the MHFA. The residential component
leased-up well and the retail did not lag significantly.
The project is currently meeting proforma expectations and
one would expect that pattern will continue. The building
is very striking and certainly helps to improve the image of
the Central Square neighborhood (see Fig. 8).
Although all developments are negotiated to some
extent, the City of Cambridge relies primarily on zoning to
control and regulate uses as opposed to the BRA's negotiated
approach. It is more straightforward than Boston's
negotiated process and in this case at least achieves the
desired result. Zoning establishes the basic rules of the
game and if exceptions are not required, helps to streamline
the review process. Given the opportunity, a competent
developer will respond appropriately and will maximize
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Figure 8. Church Corner. Photograph courtesy of Cambridge
Community Development Department.
opportunities within prescribed guidelines provided that the
financial return is commensurate with the additional risk,
if any. Although retail was not required, Winn Development
chose to include it in their development program and it
contributes to the overall retail pattern at Central Square.
Effectiveness of the ULI Approach
Each of the case study developments met the ULI
criteria to various degrees. Of the three developments,
Church Park best exhibits all of the elements which Smart
describes as being critical for the success of a infill
project. However, simply fulfilling the ULI development
criteria did not result in an immediate success at Church
Park. According to Smart the arcade, for example, would be
considered a benefit. Here it has been more of a detriment
than an advantage because potential tenants perceive it as
obscuring the view of the shops from Massachusetts Avenue.
The arcade, in combination with the deep setback from
Massachusetts Avenue and the prohibition against external
advertising has discouraged many likely tenants.
Douglass Plaza failed to meet the ULI criteria in two
key areas; location and critical mass. A small neighborhood
cluster can not offer its tenants the advantages that come
from being part of a neighborhood retail center like Church
Park, or part of a larger community retail center like
Church Corner in Central Square. Without a critical mass of
retail, many small merchants generally have difficulty
attracting enough business to survive. These merchants
benefit by "mooching" off the business generated by the
anchors in a larger center. It is therefore difficult to
attract many small tenants to these small neighborhood
clusters. In addition, as in the case of Douglass Plaza,
neighborhood clusters may not meet the needs of the larger
retail tenant either. Therefore, neighborhood clusters have
limited appeal to merchants.
Church Corner meets all of the ULI criteria but to a
lesser degree than Church Park. Location is the most
significant factor in contributing to the success of this
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very small retail component.
Conclusion
The case studies illustrate three very different
approaches public agencies can take towards the same end,
neighborhood revitalization through the development of
mixed-income housing that includes a retail component.
Church Park represented a large scale urban renewal
approach, Douglass Plaza a negotiated approach on a
comparatively small scale, and Church Corner a traditional
zoning approach also on a small scale.
Church Park and Douglass Plaza are both policy driven
projects initiated by the public sector to achieve public
objectives. In each case, this approach has produced mixed
results. The policy driven approach does not appear to meet
short term objectives of either the planners or the
developers.
Church Corner exemplifies a traditional development
process whereby the planning agency, through zoning,
establishes guidelines that allow a variety of permitted
uses where appropriate. The developer, can then assess the
ability of the market area to support the proposed uses.
The market driven approach meets both the developer's and
planner's short term objectives, but may not address long
range planning goals.
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These studies suggest that there are other
considerations which directly affect the outcome of these
retail components, such as the ability of the public agency
to control and exert influence over the development process,
and the general economic conditions of the neighborhood.
There is a disjuncture between the neat and orderly
development quality of the ULI criteria and the actual
development process (of dynamic negotiation) that is the
developer's reality. It is useful to have objective
criteria such as the ULI guidelines to apply to a proposed
development but factors other than the ULI criteria also
affect the outcome of a project.
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CHAPTER THREE
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The final chapter draws upon the case study
experiences to make general conclusions about an exaction
which amounts to a policy-driven approach to retail
development. The chapter suggests that there is an inherent
- conflict in using private developers to achieve public
objectives. Finally it will recommend actions such that the
planning agency, the developer, and the MHFA can find a
common ground to help ensure development of a viable retail
components and to reduce the burden of risk on any one
participant.
General Conclusions
1. What is perceived as good planning is not always
commensurate with a financially sound project, particularly
in the short run - the critical part for the bearer of the
note and the payer thereto. Therefore, retail development
is generally more successful if it is market driven as
opposed to policy driven.
A market-driven approach has a good expectation of
succeeding in the short term. This applies to both the
residential and retail components.
A policy-driven approach while energized by the public
sector is an entrepreneurial approach when used as a
catalyst for neighborhood reinvestment. This approach
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carries with it the risk that the project may not be
immediately viable in the short term because the market is
ill-defined or non-existent. Although the urban renewal
process by which large projects such as Church Park were
created is universally criticized, it illustrates the
advantages of large scale development here its size creates
a large portion of the market necessary to support the
retail. The extent to which the scale of a development can
influence the market should determine the amount of control
each participant can exercise throughout the process.
The entrepreneurial planning agency, does not assume
or participate in the risk of this business venture. The
risk is shifted to the developer, and ultimately to the MHFA
since their ability to enforce the developer's guarantees
has not been consistently proven.
2. Small scale infill projects like Douglass Plaza
are only likely to achieve public policy objectives and
create viable neighborhood retail districts in the long term
due primarily to location, critical mass and neighborhood
economic conditions.
The retail component at Church Park, a disaster in the
short term, proved eminently viable in the long run. This
kind of success story validates the planning agency's
objectives and supports their vision of the future.
Douglass Plaza, although on a much smaller scale, is
now what Church Park was twenty years ago; an image-setting
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development and a symbol of neighborhood reinvestment. The
processes were different, an urban renewal versus a
neighborhood based process, but the objective of the
planning agency remains the same. Like Church Park it will
probably have to wait for the neighborhood to improve
sufficiently before it becomes a viable retail space. How
long the developer can wait is a key issue that must be
addressed in this search for common ground.
3. The inclusion of a retail component to achieve
public sector goals while minimizing risk to the developer
and financing agency can only be realized if the planning
agency is willing to share the risk in return for the
provision of an amenity. Risk is greatest in publicly
initiated projects where planners require developers to
provide a retail component in anticipation of a future
market and the timing of that market is unknown. In these
situations the planning agency must be willing to share the
risk associated with their requirement, and act to reduce
those risks as much as possible.
4. The planning and design guidelines suggested by
the ULI for infill development can be followed to contribute
to, but will not ensure a project's success. The ULI
development guidelines address only the physical,
controllable aspects of a development. While these are
important, each project is affected by other externalities
which contribute its success or failure. The primary factor
being general neighborhood economic conditions.
5. The inclusion of a retail component is not always
appropriate. Sometimes there is already sufficient retail
space in the community. Resident's comments in the SENHI
study showed that the neighbor's support for the provision
of new retail space is mixed. Although many residents
support the planners ideals, there is a more pragmatic group
who would prefer to see the existing, under-utilized retail
opportunities in the neighborhood enhanced and improved and
public/private efforts concentrated on the provision of
quality housing.
This view was supported by the comments of the Fenway
residents, after the development of Church Park, which led
us to conclude that it is the provision of good housing
opportunities, not retail that contributes most to the
revitalization of a neighborhood.
On sites where ground floor retail is not required
from a design and safety standpoint, as was appropriate in
Church Corner and Church park, the provision of retail
should not be forced.
6. There should be an identifiable market for the
retail but the timing of that market should also be
carefully analyzed. The Hunneman market analysis for the
Fenway area was correct in its predictions. However,
throughout the study there was no mention of how long it
would take for their projections to be realized.
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The infusion of a neighborhood with a new residential
population will begin to strengthen the market for
retailing. Private developers can be expected to fill that
need when it materializes.
Recommendations
These conclusions suggest that the potential for the
provision of a retail component in a mixed-income housing
development varies enormously and that while its inclusion
may be appropriate from a long-term planning point of view,
is not always appropriate from a financial perspective.
However, the likelihood that the current "exactions" will
continue is great. Given the current downturn in the local
real estate market, the prospect that these objectives will
be met in the short term by the private sector, although
preferable, would be an unrealistic view.
What then is a way in which the public agency, the
developer, and the MHFA, i.e., the lender, can find common
ground? Each participant should start by attempting to
understand each other point of view.
The Planning Agency
1. The planning agency must recognize the exaction-
like quality of their current policy and be willing to share
the associated risk. Such public agencies are taking an
entrepreneurial approach to development often at the
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developers expense. They could be a party to the retail
guarantee presently required of the developer by the MHFA.
For projects where the short term viability of the retail
component may be in question, the promise of funds and other
assistance to support long term planning objectives would be
viewed as an important gesture of confidence and support.
2. The planning agency should take a stronger
interest in the functional and financial aspects of a
project, rather than focusing almost exclusively on the
public realm. Although image is an important aspect of
these projects; tenants provide the income necessary to meet
debt service payments. The inability of a development to
attract retail tenants will ultimately have a negative
impact on the residential portion of a project. Vacant
retail space does not contribute to the vitality of
streetlife no matter how good it looks from the public
realm.
3. The planning agency should consider major policy
revisions. Whyte is of the opinion that, "Cities would do
well to have the discipline of a good statute." 73 Boston,
in particular has a penchant for the unwritten policy: "In
Boston, a lack of written rules - not an excess - makes
building so frustrating. Zoning is so outdated that every
73Whyte, City, 228.
large-scale project is treated as an exception."74
Wherever possible, development policies should be
explicit in the amount of retail required. This would
ensure that future development will eventually provide the
critical mass necessary for a viable retail district. If
retail unequivocally belongs in a given location, then it
should be required through zoning. Then it will cease to be
thought of as an exaction and the developer can choose to
play by the rules or not. If the planners fear that a
retail mandate would discourage interest in the project,
then the policy should be changed to reflect the fact that
the developer is providing an amenity and some sort of bonus
incentives should apply. The current situation is most
unusual; unlike other forms of linkage, a developer is not
compensated for the provision of an amenity.
4. In Boston, the BRA could improve their efforts to
work with the business community. Through existing programs
of the Public Facilities Department they could work with the
developer to attract tenants to the new space, or to improve
the existing, under-utilized retail properties in the
neighborhood.7 For projects where the viability of the
74The Wall Street Journal, 21 March 1986.
7The Neighborhood Commercial Development Bank (NCDB),
Loans to Encourage Neighborhood Development (LEND), and BUILD,
are three programs available to eleven of Boston's
neighborhood business districts. Also available are programs
which provide funds for streetscape improvements and technical
assistance.
retail may be in question, promotional efforts should begin
early; as soon as the plan and development program are
finalized, not after projects have been identified as being
problematic. These simple actions may help make a
difference.
The MHFA
The MHFA promotes itself as an agency with a public
purpose. An agency that is ""beyond bricks and mortar",
that prides itself on having a human services component
(TAP), and that has a comprehensive residential design
review process, uncommon among lenders. Anyone familiar
with the MHFA knows that they are involved in their
residential projects. Yet, when it comes to matters
involving the inclusion of commercial space in their
projects they are uncharacteristically aloof.
Among MHFA staff, there is a prevalent attitude that
the commercial component represents an insignificant
percentage of a project and does not merit special
attention. They share the developers's view in that they
see themselves as residential experts, without sufficient
expertise to be comfortable in transactions involving
commercial real estate. In considering only the
underwriting requirements of tax-exempt bond financing they
are taking an approach which is atypical of the agency.
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Their perspective is to stick to what they do best,
financing residential developments, and allow the BRA to do
what they do best, neighborhood planning. As the MHFA
director of development put it, "by the time a project comes
to the MHFA for financing, the developer and the BRA have
already entered into negotiations."7 Therefore, it
appears that the agency is reluctant to interfere in the
development negotiations taking place between the BRA and
the Developer. The MHFA maintains an arms-length approach
to the retail/commercial component of a project.
At a minimum, the MHFA should try to be more explicit
in its policies governing commercial uses. There is little
information available to assist the developer seeking to
include a retail component. The MHFA, as lender, has
ultimate risk for the project, therefore they should at a
minimum set forth their expectations and perhaps some
guidelines for the inclusion of commercial space. Given
that the MHFA does not have commercial expertise within its
staff, this would be a good area for BRA and MHFA
collaboration.
The Developer
The developers of most MHFA financed, mixed-income
projects are self-described residential developers. They do
76Director of development Robert L. Pyne of the MHFA,
interview by author, 21 July 1991, Boston.
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not feel comfortable developing commercial space; therefore,
they would be well-advised to better educate themselves
about the basics of retail space development. In this way,
they would be able to take a stronger position when
negotiating the specifics of the program with the public
agency. Developers should also confirm that their
architects understand the spatial requirements major
retailers are looking for. They must take the lead to
ensure the most viable development of the space because, as
the Douglass Plaza case study clearly illustrated, no one is
doing it for them. The BRA and the MHFA each have their own
review agenda and the two do not necessarily coincide.
Conclusion
For developers and planners to find common ground they
must devise a modus vivendi that accommodates each other's
needs. Planning ideals, economic development objectives and
financial feasibility must be integrated.
The planner's ideals and objectives are intended to
promote the public interest and make our society a better
place to live. It is not equitable for local governmental
agencies to require a discrete part of society, i.e.,
developers, to bear the cost and risks required to effect
this benefit without a quid pro quo. Planners must either
put more incentives on the table, share the associated
risks, or be more selective in their imposition of a retail
requirement. Incentives may take the form of tax benefits
or zoning incentives.
Whatever strategy the planners choose it should
reflect a market reality. Many communities would applaud
the provision of mixed-income housing as a laudable goal
needing no further enhancement. In areas where the
inclusion of a retail component is pushing ahead of the
market, the balance of risk and reward must be carefully
considered before committing to a development program.
In spite of their best efforts, planning agencies may
not be able to achieve the neighborhood ideal that inspires
so much of their work and demands on developers. The
planner's idealism concerning the benefits resulting from
requiring small shopping clusters, i.e., that such clusters
would provide a fertile ground for small locally owned
businesses employing neighborhood youths, opportunities for
residents to interact as members of a community, and a vital
street life may just be an unrealistic expectation, but
still a worthy goal.
7The losses that a developer may suffer from having to
provide the retail space may very well provide no current tax
benefit because of the passive loss restrictions enacted in
the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). That restriction should be
eliminated where the losses are caused by the requirements of
local government authorities. Such losses should result in
current tax benefits which would help the developers cash
flow.
APPENDIX
The three case studies present a cross-section of
mixed-income residential projects. Selection was based
primarily on four factors: (1) projects must involve MHFA
tax-exempt bond financing and include a retail/commercial
component; (2) projects must be developed over different
time periods; (3) the retail components must vary in size;
and, (4) the projects must be all new construction as
opposed to rehabilitation.
Only projects financed through the MHFA were chosen
because it is generally the primary source for financing
mixed-income housing developments. Also, the agency has
identified the inclusion of a retail/commercial component in
its residential developments as problematic in many cases,
and has changed their viewpoint on it over the years. Also,
MHFA financed multi-family housing projects start with a
public purpose, the provision of mixed-income affordable
housing. Residential development projects are highly
scrutinized by MHFA staff from both a design and financial
standpoint.
Projects developed over different time periods would
reflect changes in development trends, in public policy,
and in attitudes towards retail/commercial development in
residential buildings.
Projects were selected with retail components of
different sizes to explore the impact of size and critical
mass on project feasibility.
The new construction requirement significantly
decreased the number of projects to be considered.
Rehabilitation projects were avoided because the physical
constraints which accompany the existing structure often
dictate a particular use, size, or design.
After looking at numerous projects, I chose three
which represented a range of different forms a retail
component could take. Also each project was initiated by
different parties, under different circumstances.
At one end of the range is Church Corner, with eighty-
five residential units and a minimal retail component of
3,028 square feet. At the other end is Church Park, with
508 residential units and a substantial retail component of
72,070 square feet. Douglass Plaza is in the middle with
122 residential units and seven thousand square feet of
retail space. There were no MHFA financed projects of new
construction between seven thousand and seventy-two thousand
square feet.
To obtain information regarding the inclusion of a
retail component I spoke with the developers' of two of the
three case study projects; the local planning agencies, the
Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Cambridge Community
Development Department; and the financing agency, the MHFA,
to better understand their individual perspectives and
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motivations. My conclusions are based on information
obtained during these interviews, and by direct site
observations.78
78Data reflects conditions as of June 1991 unless
otherwise specified.
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